Mediation and Judicial Services
Mediation and Judicial Services
Mediation is a means of resolving disputes in an informal and non-adversarial atmosphere. The issues that can be mediated are not restricted to medical or temporary total disability benefits.
The parties to a dispute use a neutral third party to facilitate discussion. The mediator assists the parties in identifying the issues in dispute and establishing common goals. The mediator has no decision-making authority or interest in the outcome of the dispute. Mediation allows the parties to negotiate a resolution to their disputes and to avoid the expenses and uncertainty of litigating their disputes in court.
Who are the mediators?
The mediators are employees of the Division of Workers Compensation who have received special training in the mediation process. These mediators meet or exceed the requirements established by Kansas law and the Kansas Supreme Court. Mediators receive training in conflict resolution techniques, neutrality, agreement writing, ethics, role playing, communication skills, case evaluation and the laws governing mediation.
How does mediation work?
Mediation is not mandatory or a prerequisite to a hearing but can be utilized at any point during the workers compensation process. Without full participation and good faith intentions by the parties, success through the mediation process is limited.
The mediation conference begins with the parties in a joint session. The parties are introduced and the rules of mediation are explained. Workers Compensation mediation conferences are conducted pursuant to the Dispute Resolution Act, K.S.A. 5-501, and amendments thereto.
To begin the mediation conference, the mediator gives one party the opportunity to speak without any interruptions. The other party is shown the same courtesy.
Upon completion of this initial phase, the parties, with the assistance of the mediator, will begin identifying issues and exploring all possible options to resolve their dispute. At times, the parties may be separated by the mediator or by the request of either party to discuss their respective case. This technique is known as caucusing. Although caucusing is not used in every mediation conference, it is available to all the parties. The purpose of caucusing is to gather or share additional information which the party may be reluctant to express in front of the other party, or perhaps to discuss possible resolution options. Mediation works only if the parties are willing to participate and discuss the issues in good faith.
What happens if no agreement is reached?
Mediation does not promise to resolve all disputes, but it does provide a forum for sincere and meaningful discussion on the issues. If no agreement is reached, only that fact is made part of the docket file. Thus, neither party is prejudiced in later hearings.
What happens if an agreement is reached?
If an agreement is reached, the mediator will put the agreement in writing. Thereafter, the agreement may be forwarded to an administrative law judge (ALJ) for approval. If so, upon approval by the ALJ, the agreement will have the same force and effect as an agreed order or award.
What does mediation cost?
The Division of Workers Compensation promotes and encourages mediation in workers compensation cases by offering professional mediation free of charge.
Professional mediators elsewhere charge an hourly fee that can be in excess of $100, depending on the complexity of the dispute.
With nothing to lose and much to gain, mediation through the Division of Workers Compensation is a cost-effective way of resolving disputes within the workers compensation system.
If a worker and employer have a disagreement about Workers Compensation benefits, the division's Judicial unit provides a forum for promptly resolving the issue.
The division has 10 Administrative Law Judges throughout the state whose primary function is resolving disputes in contested workers compensation claims by conducting prehearing conferences, encouraging settlements and conducting hearings to resolve issues the parties cannot resolve on their own. If a hearing is held, an ALJ issues an order or award based on the facts and Kansas workers compensation law. For an initial, temporary, determination of benefits, preliminary hearings are set on a priority basis, and preliminary decisions are issued within five business days of the completion of the hearing, excluding weekends and holidays.
- How to File for a Hearing: Workers Compensation Practice and Procedure Guide (K-WC 14)
- How to File for a Hearing - Unrepresented K-WC 28 (English)
- How to File for a Hearing - Unrepresented K-WC 280 (Spanish)
To set a hearing before an administrative law judge, the worker or employer must file an application for hearing with the division. Special administrative law judges conduct settlement hearings for the division. If the worker or employer wants to set a preliminary hearing, the worker or employer must follow the procedure for filing an application for preliminary hearing. If the worker or employer has a dispute concerning additional medical treatment after a final award granting future medical treatment has been issued, the party must follow the procedure for filing an application for post-award medical treatment. If the worker or employer has a dispute concerning whether additional compensation is payable after a final award allowing review and modification has been issued, the party must follow the procedure for filing an application for review and modification. Parties that are represented by an attorney should contact their attorney to dicuss whether a hearing on their workers compensation claim is necessary.
Disputes over Workers Compensation benefits can also be resolved by mediation. The division has certified mediators who will, free of charge, help an injured worker and employer reach an agreement on contested issues. You can learn more about mediation in the section above.
Regional Administrative Law Judges Offices
Administrative Law Judge - Garden City
Administrative Law Judges - Topeka
Administrative Law Judges - Lenexa
Administrative Law Judges - Wichita
Administrative Law Judge - Salina
The Board was established in 1993 to decide appeals of orders and awards from the workers compensation administrative law judges. Hoping to obtain more uniform decisions throughout the state, the Legislature created the Board to replace the state's district court judges in the appeal process. By statute the Appeals Board’s authority to review preliminary orders is limited to issues of compensability.
The Appeals Board reviews decisions of Administrative Law Judges on a de novo basis, based on the Kansas Workers Compensation Act, administrative regulations, and current caselaw. Review is on the record. All five Board members decide final orders, awards and modifications of final awards. Review of preliminary hearing orders are decided by a single Board member.
The Board has the authority to:
- Grant or deny compensation
- Increase or diminish any award of compensation
- Remand any matter to the administrative law judge for further proceedings
Decisions from the Board are due within 30 days from the date arguments are presented.
For questions about the Appeals Board, please contact email@example.com.
Current Board Members (effective January 1, 2021)
- Rebecca Sanders (Chair)
- John F. Carpinelli
- Seth G. Valerius
- William G. Belden
- Chris A. Clements
Filing Requirements: A request for review must be filed in OSCAR within 10 days (excluding weekends and holidays) from the effective date of the Administrative Law Judge's decision. Each party not represented by legal counsel who files by fax shall retain the original document in the party's possession or control during the pendency of the action and shall produce this document upon request by the division, administrative law judge, workers compensation board, or any party to the action. Upon failure to produce the document, the fax may be stricken, and the party may be subject to sanctions under K.S.A. 44-5,120(d)(20), and amendments thereto. The Appeals Board will send the parties a notice confirming the filing of the application for review and establishing the parties’ deadlines for the filing of briefs. The Appeals Board limits its review to the evidence presented to the Administrative Law Judge, and will not receive additional evidence on review.
Appeal of Awards or Modifications of Awards: The appellant's brief is due 30 days from the date the application is filed and the appellee's brief is due 20 days from the date of the appellant's brief. The appellant may submit a reply brief within 10 days responding only to new issues raised in the appellee’s brief.
At the time the briefing schedule is established and a hearing date scheduled, the case will be reviewed and a decision will be made on whether oral argument is necessary. If the Board finds oral argument is not necessary, the case will be placed on the summary docket for decision without oral argument, and the parties will be notified accordingly.
Appeal of Final Orders, Post Award Medical and Preliminary Orders: The appellant's brief is due 10 days from the date the application is filed and appellee's brief is due 10 days later. The day following the last brief, the case is deemed submitted to the Board for decision. Again, the parties must provide five copies of each pleading filed. Appeals of post-award medical and preliminary orders are placed on the summary docket without oral argument.
Appeals to the Court of Appeals and Certification of Record: Any final order of the Board may be appealed to the Court of Appeals. Once the Board issues its order, the administrative file is returned to the Director. The Director's office is responsible for certifying the record for cases being appealed to the Court of Appeals. If a party intends to appeal a final order of the Board to the Court of Appeals they must request the Director certify the record.
Appeals Decisions are available on Westlaw. As a convenience to our customers, this page contains links to Appeals Board Decisions added to the Workers Compensation website up to the last three months.
A number sign (or pound, hash or # symbol) after the docket number denotes an “old law” decision that is based on the statutes that were in effect prior to May 15th, 2011, or in other words, that apply to a claim for an injury that occurred prior to May 15, 2011.
Soon you will also be able search for a decision by typing keywords into the box below. Keywords can be topics such as preexisting, citations such as 44-501, names of one or more of the parties to a claim, docket numbers, or any other desired set of alphanumerical characters (such as letters of the alphabet and numbers).
Note: If you have difficulty opening the file, the Board Decisions are saved in a PDF format for improved accessibility and search capabilities. You will need a PDF reader such as Adobe Reader (available free at adobe.com) to open or print the files. If you have difficulty in opening any of the decision files, you may need to update your version of the reader. If after updating your reader you continue to have difficulties, please contact the Workers Compensation Division for support.
|Case Name||Order Date||Issue||Holding|
1. What is the nature and extent of Claimant's permanent impairment; 2. Is Claimant entitled to future medical treatment.
The Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision Claimant has a 8.5 percent body as a whole impairment. The ALJ averaged the two impairment ratings of the two testifying doctors. In affirming the ALJ, the Board cited the Supreme Court case of Johnson v. U.S. Foods and Court of Appeals cases of Zimero v. Tyson Fresh Meats and Garcia v. Tyson Fresh Meats. One of the testifying doctors rating was the same as the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 4th Edition rating. The Board found the rating should not be disregarded for that reason because there was competent medical evidence justifying the rating. Future medical is allowed on proper application based on Claimant’s current condition and one the doctors testified as to Claimant’s need for future medical.
1. Was Claimant's employment with Respondent covered by the Act, specifically was Respondent engaged in an agricultural pursuit, 2. Was Clamant an independent contractor or an employee and 3. did Respondent have sufficient payroll for coverage under the act? 4. Did Claimant's accidental injury arise out of and in the course of employment and 5. did Claimant provide proper notice?
It was found Claimant’s employment was covered by the Act. Respondent was a horse rescue facility and was not engaged in an agricultural pursuit but in an charitable operation. Claimant was found to be an employee and not an independent contractor. Respondent had a payroll of over $20,000 for the year preceding the accident and the year the accident occurred. Claimant’s accidental injury arose out of and in the course of employment, despite Claimant performing tasks for Respondent on her day off. Claimant provided actual notice of her accident because her supervisor was present and witnessed the accidental injury when it occurred.
Did Claimant provide notice of injury?
This is an appeal from a preliminary Order wherein the ALJ (Troy Larson) found Respondent had actual notice of Claimant's injury and awarded benefits. The Board Member reversed the ALJ. The parties agreed Claimant's date of accident was March 9, 2021 (her last day worked) and she did not provide timely notice pursuant to K.S.A. 44-520(a)(1). Claimant sought medical treatment at her own expense and sought time off for her surgery. Noting the Board has previously held knowledge of a medical condition or accident is not sufficient to satisfy the "actual knowledge of the injury," the Board Member found Respondent did not have actual knowledge of a work-related injury and denied benefits.
Post-Award Attorney Fees
The ALJ's award of 3.5 hours of attorney fees at $225.00 per hour was affirmed. The post-award proceedings were not frivolous. The Board affirmed the reasonableness of the attorney fees after considering based on K.S.A. 44-536(g) and KRPC 1.5.
Did Claimant's accidental injury arise out of and in the course of employment?
It was found Claimant's accidental injury, when Claimant fell walking to the bathroom was compensable. Walking to the bathroom arose out of Claimant's employment because it was clearly within the confines of the personal comfort doctrine and incidental to her employment
1. What is the nature and extent of the claimant's disability? 2. Is the claimant entitled to future medical treatment?
The Award was affirmed in part and reversed in part. In the Award, the ALJ awarded a 23% permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole and denied future medical treatment. The Board affirmed the 23% permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole and reversed the portion denying future medical treatment.
Nature and extent
The Appeals Board found Claimant sustained compensable injuries to the right shoulder and neck. Permanent partial disability compensation was awarded based on a split of the rating physicians’ shoulder ratings and the single neck rating in evidence, converted to the body as a whole under the AMA Guides, 6th Edition.
Did Claimant sustain injuries from an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment?
Claimant sustained injuries from a motor vehicle accident occurring while Claimant was on a public street going to a restaurant during her lunch break. The Appeals Board ruled the personal comfort doctrine did not apply because the accident occurred while Claimant was off the employer’s premises. The Board held the claim was non-compensable under the going and coming rule, and was not compensable due to intrinsic travel, a special route with a particular risk, or occurred during a work-related errand.
|Case Name||Order Date||Issue||Holding|
|Mark Farmer v. Southwind Drilling CS-00-0449-651 > AP-00-0466-095||9/2/2022||1. What is the nature and extent of Claimant's disability, including whether Claimant is entitled to compensation for a scheduled or whole person impairment? If whole person impairment is awarded, is Claimant entitled to work disability compensation? 2. What is Claimant's average weekly wage? 3 Is Claimant entitled to an underpayment of TTD benefits? 4. Is Claimant entitled to future medical treatment?||Claimant appealed the April 21, 2022 Award of ALJ, Bruce Moore. The ALJ awarded compensation for a scheduled injury, thereby denying Claimant's request for compensation based on work disability; found Claimant's average weekly wage due to the injury occurring on Claimant's second day of work; found an underpayment of TTD; and, denied Claimant's request for future medical benefits. The Board affirmed the ALJ's finding of a scheduled injury to the shoulder; modified the ALJ's calculation of claimant's AWW which affected Claimant's TTD underpayment; and, reversed the ALJ's denial of future medical treatment.|
|Linda Henretty v. Health Center Northwest, LLC CS-00-0461-209 > AP-00-0468-875||9/2/2022||1. Does Kansas have jurisdiction over this claim under the Workers Compensation Act based on where the claimant's contract of employment with the respondent occurred? 2. If so, is the claimant estopped from seeking workers compensation benefits in Kansas because she already pursued her claim in the State of Montana?||The Award was affirmed. The ALJ found the paperwork the claimant completed for the respondent in Montana, after she was hired, was more a formality than a condition precedent to obtaining the job, and the claimant is not estopped from claiming workers compensation benefits in Kansas after previously receiving benefits in Montana. The ALJ ordered the Fund to pay the claimant an underpayment in temporary total disability benefits. The Board majority affirmed the ALJ.|
|James Vilmer v. Omaha Track, Inc. CS-00-0447-898 > AP-00-0468-608||9/8/2022||1. Did Claimant sustain personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with Respondent on November 11, 2019, including was Claimant's accident the prevailing factor causing his medical condition and need for treatment? 2. Did the ALJ err by appointing and authorizing a physician to provide treatment and order Respondent to reimburse Claimant $500 for unauthorized medical?||The Board previously upheld the ALJ's denial of benefits finding Claimant failed to prove his accident was the prevailing factor causing his medical condition and need for treatment. Following the prior Board Order, Claimant was evaluated by Dr. Loury Jones. Based on the opinions of Dr. Jones, the ALJ found Claimant's injury did arise out of and in the course of his employment and the prevailing factor causing his injury and need for medical treatment. The Board Member affirmed the ALJ's order finding the claim compensable. The Board Member also found the Board was without jurisdiction to address Respondent's appeal of the ALJ designating an authorized treating physician and order requiring reimbursement of unauthorized medical to Claimant.|
|Lois Schuster-Crouse v. SKF USA, Inc. CS-00-0446-629 > AP-00-0463-804||9/12/2022||Evidentiary, Future medical, Nature and extent||The Board affirmed the ALJ sustaining objections to the introduction of an SSD award and FCE without foundational testimony. The ALJ's award of future medical was affirmed. Claimant's request for permanent total disability compensation was denied, and the award of work disability was modified. The Board found the evidence proved Claimant's wage loss was directly traceable to her work-related injury and was not due solely to an economic layoff.|
|Phillip Peavy v. Deffenbaugh Industries, Inc. CS-00-044-234 > AP-00-0468-398||9/19/2022||ALJ Recusal, Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute||Claimant appealed the ALJ's denial of a motion to recuse and the granting of Respondent's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The denial of the motion to recuse was affirmed because Claimant failed to prove bias, prejudice or interest of the administrative law judge. The order dismissing this matter was affirmed because Claimant did not file a motion for an extension of time to prosecute and did not prove good cause for the failure to prosecute.|
|Maria Nunez Rabelo v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp. CS-00-0447-245 > AP-00-0467-925||9/21/2022||Nature and extent of disability and award of future medical benefits||Respondent appealed the 5/25/22 Award issued by SALJ, Mark Kolich. Respondent appealed nature and extent of disability and award of future medical benefits. The SALJ citing Johnson and Garcia stated functional impairment for unscheduled injuries are determined by competent medical evidence and the 6th Edition of the Guides is the starting point in this determination. The Board affirmed the SALJ's award of future medical benefits and modified Claimant's functional impairment from 15% to the body as a whole to 9% based on the opinions of the court-ordered evaluator, Dr. Pratt.|
|Claudio Sanchez Molina (dec'd) v. 3D Well Service CS-00-0464-794 > AP-00-0468-971||9/15/2022||1. Does the Division of Workers Compensation have jurisdiction over the deceased claimant's dependent son? 2. Does the Board have jurisdiction to address the constitutionality of: (A) the statutory cap on death benefits, as well as payments over time, and (B) the denial of the right to a jury trial?||The Award was vacated and remanded to the ALJ. In the Award, the ALJ awarded death benefits pursuant to the parties' agreement. The Board determined a fundamental issue, raised sua sponte by the Board, concerned whether jurisdiction existed over the wholly dependent child. The Application for Benefits did not list the wholly dependent child nor did the record reflect an attorney-client contract showing representation of the wholly dependent child. Therefore, the Board majority vacated and remanded the matter to the ALJ to confirm whether the wholly dependent child is represented through an attorney-client contract and amend the Application for Benefits to include the wholly dependent child.|
|Claude Lemon v. Unified School District 489 CS-00-0448-290 > AP-00-0464-688||9/30/2022||Nature and Extent of Disability, Future Medical||The ALJ awarded 8 percent impairment of the whole body and denied future medical treatment. The Board agreed with the ALJ and affirmed the 8 Percent, giving more weight to the opinions of Dr. Estivo. The Board reversed and awarded future medical treatment, finding claimant overcame the presumption no medical treatment would be needed.|
|William Weaver v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County -- CS-00-0438-834 > AP-00-0464-459||8/31/2022||Nature and extent of Claimant’s disability; deduction of the per month partial disability compensation awarded to Claimant pursuant to K.S.A. 44-501(e); interest pursuant to K.S.A. 44-512b; and future medical treatment.||The ALJ awarded an 8 percent permanent partial impairment to the right upper extremity, denied future medical treatment, disallowed a credit for Claimant’s preexisting impairment, and denied pre-award interest. The Board majority affirmed the 8 percent even though there was a higher Johnson rating in the record, citing Butler v. The Goodyear. A Board Member dissented, arguing the competent medical evidence standard applied to scheduled injuries, notwithstanding Butler. The Board Majority affirmed the ALJ on the denial awarding respondent a credit for a preexisting functional impairment award. A Board Member dissented on this issue. The Board Majority found, while they did not prevail on the issue, they had just cause or excuse for non-payment. The Board reversed the ALJ’s denial of future medical treatment.|
|Amany Orfy v. Walmart Asssociates, Inc. -- CS-00-0448-866 > AP-00-0464-570||8/30/2022||What is the nature and extent of Claimant's impairment, including whether Claimant is entitled to a work disability?||The primary issue was whether Claimant’s wage loss was attributable to the work injury. Claimant had a failed back surgery and severe restrictions such as using a walker, not lifting over 10 pounds and not standing longer than 5 minutes. Claimant limited her work to 20 hours per week due to her pain and the difficulty performing her job duties. Respondent argued since no doctor limited Claimant to 20 hours per week her wage loss was not due to her work injury. The Board held Claimant’s wage loss was attributable to her work injury due to Claimant’s own testimony about her condition, her severe work restrictions and a task loss of 96.5 percent. Claimant was awarded a 61.9 percent task loss.|
|Amanda Cruz v. Salas Plumbing & Remodeling, LLC -- CS-00-0458-965 > AP-00-0468-332||8/30/2022||Did Claimant meet with personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment?||Respondent appealed the June 14, 2022 preliminary hearing order issued by the ALJ. Claimant drove Respondent to the bank to make a deposit. Claimant drove to O'Reilly's to purchase Freon for her automobile. After purchasing the Freon and while returning to her car, Claimant fell, breaking both ankles. Judge Klein found Claimant's stop at O'Reilly's was with Respondent's permission and therefore her accidental injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment. The Board affirmed the ALJ finding the trip to O'Reilly's was not a major deviation from the business route or objective. Therefore, Claimant's injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment.|
|Ronald Wilcome v. National Express, LLC -- CS-00-0441-088 > AP-00-0468-526||8/26/2022||K.S.A. 44-523(f)(1): Did Claimant establish good cause for not proceeding to regular hearing, settlement hearing, or agreed award in a timely fashion?||The ALJ granted respondent's motion to dismiss, finding Claimant failed to establish cause for not proceeding to regular hearing, settlement hearing, or agreed award in a timely fashion. The Board found evidence to support a Claimant had not yet reached MMI, creating a conclusive presumption Claimant has shown good cause for an extension of the three-year period. Therefore, The ALJ's Order was reversed and claimant's request for an extension of time to proceed to regular hearing, settlement hearing, or agreed award was granted.|
|Gilma De Paz Sagastume v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. -- CS-00-0329-059 > AP-00-0463-778||8/24/2022||Termination for Cause||The ALJ found claimant's compensation was limited to functional impairment only, because claimant was terminated for cause. The Board agreed and affirmed.|
|Joshua McGuire v. Walmart Associates, Inc. --- CS-00-0463-151 > AP-00-0467-894||8/24/2022||Prevailing Factor/Aggravation of a preexisting condition|
This is an appeal from a preliminary hearing where the ALJ found claimant's accident was not the prevailing factor causing the medical condition, but rather related to a cyst or lesion located at the fracture site. A Board Member found claimant met the burden of proving prevailing factor and identified the fracture as being new and distinct from the preexisting cyst.
|Angie Knight v. Milli's Fine Furniture CS-00-0464-244 > AP-00-0468-431||8/18/2022||1. Was the insurance carrier denied due process due to lack of notice of the preliminary hearing? 2. Did the ALJ exceed his jurisdiction by ordering the insurance carrier to pay medical benefits?||The preliminary order was affirmed. The ALJ found the respondent and insurance carrier were provided appropriate notice of the hearing and ordered payment of medical benefits. One Board Member concluded the insurance carrier was not denied due process based on appellant precedent and the ALJ had authority to order payment of medical benefits.|
|Manuel Guerrero v. Deno’s Trucking CS-00-0149-215 > AP-00-0464-333||8/16/2022||1. Did the respondent have the requisite payroll threshold of $20,000 to be subject to the Kansas Workers Compensation Act? 2. What is the nature and extent of the claimant's disability? 3. Is the claimant entitled to future medical?||The Award was reversed. The Board majority denied an award of compensation after concluding the evidentiary record did not prove sufficient payroll in both 2015 and 2016. All other issues are moot.|
|Yordy Gamez Oliver v. National Beef Packing Co. CS-00-0315-522 > AP-00-0464-295||8/15/2022||Does the Board have jurisdiction to issue an order when Claimant died and no real party in interest has been substituted for Claimant?||The Board vacated the ALJ’s order because there is no real party in interest identified in the case since Claimant’s death and the ALJ did not have jurisdiction to enter an order. Claimant died due to causes not related to his injury before the total amount of the award was paid out. No substitution of parties was filed after Claimant’s death and no estate has been opened on Claimant’s behalf. The ALJ ruled Claimant was only entitled to benefits up to the date of his death (see K.S.A. 44-510e(b)). Respondent was ordered to make payment to the estate once a proper probate was filed. If no probate is filed the benefits shall be paid into trust until here is a determination of lawful heirs.|
|Yusimi Cabeza v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp. CS-00-0443-726 > AP-00-0464-622||8/5/2022||1. Did the claimant's injuries arise out of and in the course of her employment, including whether her work activities were the prevailing factor causing her injuries, need for medical treatment and impairment? 2. If found compensable, is the claimant entitled to temporary total disability (TTD) benefits from July 29, 2019 to November 10, 2021, future medical benefits and unauthorized medical benefits? 3. What is the nature and extent of claimant's disability?||The Award was affirmed. The ALJ denied an award of compensation after finding the claimant did not prove her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment, including not proving the work activities or accident to be the prevailing factor in her injury. The Board majority affirmed the ALJ’s denial of compensation. All other issues are moot.|
|Case Name||Order Date||Issue||Holding|
1. Was the claimant's work accident the prevailing factor causing his thoracic spine injury, medical condition, and resulting disability or impairment? 2. Are the claimant's medical expenses incurred on his own subject to the $500 reimbursement cap for unauthorized medical under K.S.A. 44-510? Is the claimant entitled to future medical treatment? 3. Is the respondent entitled to a credit for voluntary payment of unearned wages?
The Award was modified. The Board concluded: (1) the claimant's work accident was the prevailing factor causing his thoracic spine injury; (2) the respondent is not required to pay all of the claimant's unauthorized medical bills and expenses as authorized medical treatment; and (3) the respondent is not entitled to a credit for payment of unearned wages. The Board majority found the claimant's unauthorized medical treatment received prior to reaching maximum medical improvement is subject to the $500 allowance. One Board Member dissented finding the respondent responsible for the claimant's medical treatment after he was released at maximum medical improvement.
Was the alleged repetitive trauma the prevailing factor causing Claimant's injury and need for additional medical treatment?
The preliminary order awarding medical treatment was affirmed. The Court-ordered physician opined Claimant's work was the prevailing factor causing his injury. The physician was deposed, and did not change his opinions. One Board Member concluded Claimant met his burden of proving his work duties were the prevailing factor causing his injury and need for additional treatment.
Does the Board have jurisdiction over a preliminary hearing order in which the calculation of a social security offset was contested.
The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The decision of the ALJ did not exceed her jurisdiction and the subject matter of the decision was not subject to K.S.A. 44-534(a).
Injury by accident arising out of employment
The ALJ found claimant's injury was limited to her right hand and denied compensation for her shoulder and right arm, due to inconsistencies in the evidence. A single Board Member agreed and affirmed.
1. Is the April 26, 2016, accident the prevailing factor in Claimant’s right elbow and wrist medical conditions, need for medical treatment and resulting disability or impairment? 2. What is the nature and extent of Claimant’s impairment? 3. Is Claimant entitled to future medical treatment?
Respondent requested review of ALJ Sample's Award finding Claimant's accident was the prevailing factor for his injuries to his right wrist and elbow and awarding future medical benefits. The Board adopted the ALJ's analysis and review of the medical evidence and affirmed the ALJ's Award of compensation for the right wrist and elbow. The Board also adopted the ALJ's rationale awarding regarding future medical benefits and affirmed the award of future medical benefits.
Are Claimant’s repetitive job duties with Respondent the prevailing factor in causing bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, need for medical treatment and resulting impairment?
It was found Claimant's repetitive keyboarding job duties for Respondent were not the prevailing factor for the development of bilateral carpal tunnel. Two upper extremity specialists, including a Court ordered IME, opined repetitive keyboarding is not prevailing factor in developing bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. Claimant's gender and her age more than likely were the cause. Claimant's medical expert was an internal medicine specialist. Two upper extremity specialists are more persuasive as to the prevailing factor for Claimant's bilateral carpal tunnel.
Is the claimant entitled to a work disability award? Within this question is: (1) whether the claimant's wage loss is directly attributable to his work injury and no other causes or factors; (2) what is the claimant's post-injury wage earning capability; and (3) did the claimant refuse accommodated employment?
The Review and Modification Award was modified. The Board concluded: (1) the claimant's wage loss was directly attributable to his work injury; (2) the claimant is entitled to a work disability award in excess of the 10 weeks awarded by the ALJ; and (3) the claimant did not refuse accommodated employment because the respondent never made a bona fide offer.
1. Is the claimant's intervening welding burn to his leg a natural and probable consequence of his original injury? 2. Did the ALJ exceed his jurisdiction by ordering repair or replacement of the claimant's three wheelchairs; handicap modifications to a truck, should the claimant purchase a truck in the next year; prepayment into the claimant's attorney's trust account for the estimated cost of the handicap modifications to the truck; and requiring the respondent to secure any necessary billing forms for payment of the claimant's work-related treatment?
The preliminary order awarding medical treatment for the claimant's leg burn was affirmed. The claimant testified his leg paralysis made it difficult to know he had a "spark" on his skin. The ALJ reasoned the claimant would not have sustained a serious leg burn and infection if he had normal sensation in his legs and accompanying defensive reflexes. The explanation set forth by the claimant and the ALJ's rationale are reasonable. One Board Member concluded the claimant's leg burn was the direct and natural result of his original injury and the leg burn was caused primarily by the original work accident.
|Joyce Delatorre v. Reser’s Fine Foods CS-00-0069-797 > AP-00-0463-400||6/29/2022||Injury by repetitive trauma, prevailing factor, nature and extent of disability, unauthorized and future medical treatment||The ALJ found proved a repetitive use injury to her left hamstring, but failed prove a work-related injury to her back. The ALJ no evidence of permanent impairment. The Board agreed with the ALJ, finding claimant suffered hamstring injury, which had resolved. The Board denied compensation for the low back claim, which did not arise until after claimant no longer worked for respondent. The Board affirmed the ALJ on the issues of injury by repetitive trauma, prevailing factor, nature and extent of disability and future medical. The Board awarded unauthorized medical, as it was not included in the Award.|
|Vedrene Elias v. Mosaic Coffeyville - CS-00-0463-630 > AP-00-0464-930||6/28/2022||Did Claimant sustain a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment?||The Board determined Claimant’s inability to testify consistently on the most basic facts of her accidental injury, led to the conclusion Claimant’s left foot injury did not arise out and in the course of her employment. Claimant’s request for workers compensation benefits was denied.|
|Dijana Ponjavic v. Kerry, Inc., CS-00-0097-907 > AP-00-0463-214||6/28/2022||1. Is the work accident the prevailing factor for the injury, medical condition, need for treatment and the resulting disability? 2. What is the nature and extent of Claimant's disability? 3. Is Claimant entitled to future medical benefits?||The ALJ denied all benefits finding Claimant failed to prove her accident was the prevailing factor in causing her medical condition, need for treatment and resulting impairment. The Board reversed the ALJ's Award and remanded it back to the ALJ with instructions to make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding nature and extent of disability and future medical benefits.|
|EagleMed v. Travelers CS-00-0410-870 > AP-00-0427-458||6/21/2022||Medical Fee Schedule: Usual and Customary charges for air ambulance service.||This case was remanded to the Board from the Supreme Court with directions to make a factual finding, supported by substantial competent evidence in light of the record as a whole, of usual and customary charges that reflects both Airline Deregulation Act and the statutory purposes for our workers compensation fee schedule. The Board remanded the case to the Hearing Officer. The parties are directed to submit evidence of usual and customary charges for the services at issue. The Hearing Officer is directed to issue an order on remand containing the findings of fact and conclusions of law on whether the charges submitted by Healthcare Provider are permissible under the 2012 fee schedule and Airline Deregulation Act as usual and customary charges.|
|EagleMed v. Travelers CS-00-0043-233 > AP-00-0427-589||6/21/2022||Medical Fee Schedule: Usual and Customary charges for air ambulance service.||This case was remanded to the Board from the Supreme Court with directions to make a factual finding, supported by substantial competent evidence in light of the record as a whole, of usual and customary charges that reflects both Airline Deregulation Act and the statutory purposes for our workers compensation fee schedule. The Board remanded the case to the Hearing Officer. The parties are directed to submit evidence of usual and customary charges for the services at issue. The Hearing Officer is directed to issue an order on remand containing the findings of fact and conclusions of law on whether the charges submitted by Healthcare Provider are permissible under the 2012 fee schedule and Airline Deregulation Act as usual and customary charges.|
|EagleMed v. Travelers CS-00-0031-845 > AP-00-0427-470||6/21/2022||Medical Fee Schedule: Usual and Customary charges for air ambulance service.||This case was remanded to the Board from the Supreme Court with directions to make a factual finding, supported by substantial competent evidence in light of the record as a whole, of usual and customary charges that reflects both Airline Deregulation Act and the statutory purposes for our workers compensation fee schedule. The Board remanded the case to the Hearing Officer. The parties are directed to submit evidence of usual and customary charges for the services at issue. The Hearing Officer is directed to issue an order on remand containing the findings of fact and conclusions of law on whether the charges submitted by Healthcare Provider are permissible under the 2012 fee schedule and Airline Deregulation Act as usual and customary charges.|
|EagleMed v. Travelers CS-00-0234-819 > AP-00-0427-574||6/21/2022||Medical Fee Schedule: Usual and Customary charges for air ambulance service.|
|Michael Letterman v. City of Chanute CS-00-0457-402 > AP-00-0466-144||6/14/2022||1. Did Claimant’s injury on May 10, 2019, arise out of and in the course of his employment? Specifically, did Claimant’s injury occur as the result of a normal activity of day-to-day living or a neutral risk with no particular employment character. 2. Is Claimant’s April 6, 2021, left shoulder injury the natural and probable consequence of his May 10, 2019 injury, and therefore, not compensable?||Respondent appealed the ALJ's preliminary order finding Claimant's left knee injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. In so doing, the ALJ rejected Respondent's arguments that Claimant's injury was the result of a day-to-day activity or neutral risk without any particular employment or personal character and awarded benefits for Claimant's left knee. Claimant argued the ALJ erred in the denial of a left shoulder injury finding it was not the natural & probable consequence of his original injury. A single Board Member rejected Claimant's arguments and affirmed the ALJ's denial of benefits for the left shoulder.|
|Michele Collins v. E. Medical Group of Kansas, Inc. CS-00-0464-032 > AP-00-0464-962||6/13/2022||Did Claimant sustain personal injury from an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment?||The preliminary decision of the ALJ concluding Claimant sustained personal injury from a motor vehicle accident arising out of and in the course of her employment was affirmed. Claimant proved she sustained injuries from a motor vehicle accident occurring while Claimant was in Respondent's service as a traveling nurse. Respondent did not prove the accident was caused by an idiopathic cause, a personal risk, or from a neutral cause with no particular employment or personal character.|
|Eric Rhodes v. Wildcat Concrete Services, Inc. -- CS-00-0444-243 > AP-00-0464-351||6/9/2022||Does the Board have jurisdiction to review an appeal filed from an Order on Motion to Terminate Benefits?||The Board dismissed this appeal because K.S.A. 44-534a does not grant jurisdiction to the Board to review an order on whether or not medical benefits are authorized. Respondent attempted to contest compensability of a claim by filing a Motion To Terminate Medical Benefits instead of using the prescribed statutory method of a preliminary hearing application.|
|Case Name||Order Date||Issue||Holding|
|Chris Sigwing v. United Parcel Service CS-00-0447-390 > AP-00-0464-591||5/31/2022||ALJ Jurisdiction||ALJ reinstated TTD based upon medical report suggesting referral to a physical medicine specialist. Respondent argued the ALJ exceeded his jurisdictional authority by awarding TTD after Claimant was placed at maximum medical improvement. A Board Member found respondent failed to raise a jurisdictional issue pursuant to K.S.A. 44-534a. Appeal dismissed.|
|Scott Suitter v. Johnsonville Sausage, LLC CS-00-0457-142 > AP-00-0464-769||5/31/2022||Did the claimant forfeit his right to compensation by refusing to submit to a urinalysis?||The claimant forfeited his rights to compensation due to refusal to submit to a urinalysis.|
|Jose Ayala v. Alpha Roofing, LLC -- CS-00-0459-273 > AP-00-0464-601||5/26/2022||1. Is Claimant an independent contractor or an employee of Respondent? 2. What is Claimant’s average weekly wage (AWW)? 3. What is the prevailing factor causing Claimant’s injury, medical condition, and need for medical treatment?||Respondent appealed the preliminary hearing order finding claimant to be an employee and not an independent contractor. A single Board Member affirmed the ALJ’s finding claimant was an employee and not an independent contractor. The Board Member also found the Board was without jurisdiction to review the other issues raised by Respondent-AWW, TTD, authorization of medical treatment and payment of medical bills.|
|Troy Russell v. Morton Salt Inc. CS-00-0453-385 > AP-00-0463-876||5/24/2022||Compensability of motor vehicle accident on the way to unauthorized medical appointment||The ALJ found Claimant’s injury compensable and ordered medical treatment based upon Taylor v. Centex Const. Co., 191 Kan. 130, 379 P.2d 217, 217 (1963). A board member noted prior cases finding accidents occurring on the way to or from medical appointments compensable occurred while obtaining authorized medical treatment. Taylor tied the employer’s liability to its statutory duty to furnish medical care and the employee’s duty to submit to reasonable medical treatment under the Act. Board member reversed.|
|DeAnn Cambers v. Fort Scott Community College CS-00-0445-377 > AP-00-0462-506||5/23/2022||Occupational Disease/Repetitive trauma arising out of||The ALJ found Claimant failed to sustain her burden of proving she suffered a work-related occupational disease or injury of any kind while working for respondent and denied compensation. The Board agreed claimant failed to prove occupational disease or repetitive trauma from alleged exposure to mold. A concurring opinion expanded the analysis on the repetitive trauma aspect.|
|Kendall Turner v. Pleasant Acres, LLC -- CS-00-0058-238 > AP-00-0452-449||5/18/2022||The Kansas Court of Appeals remanded it December 16, 2020, Award to the Board for a determination of the amount of the Fund’s subrogation lien and credit against the workers compensation award under K.S.A. 44-504(b).||Order on Remand from the Kansas Court of Appeals. The Board remanded the case to the ALJ with instructions to receive evidence and make findings regarding a subrogation lien pursuant to K.S.A. 44-504.|
|James Morris v. Shilling Construction Co., Inc. CS-00-0434-953 > AP-00-0450-807||5/16/2022||Should the case be remanded to the ALJ to address the claimant’s impairment of function under a Johnson analysis? Should the case be remanded to the ALJ to address the claimant’s average weekly wage?||Yes on both points. The case was remanded to the ALJ to address the claimant’s impairment of function under a Johnson analysis. The case was remanded to the ALJ to address the claimant’s average weekly wage?|
|Jesus Quinones v. GEM Transport, LLC CS-00-0461-921 > AP-00-0464-520||5/13/2022|
1. Does the Appeals Board possess authority to consider the application for review under K.S.A. 44-534a?
2. Is Claimant barred from seeking benefits under K.S.A. 44-503c?
3. Did the employment relationship exist between Claimant and Respondent?
|The Board has authority to consider the employment issue under K.S.A. 44-534a because it is a “certain defense” pertaining to compensability. Claimant was not barred from seeking compensation under K.S.A. 44-503c because he was not the owner of the vehicle. A direct employment relationship did not exist because Respondent did not have the right to control how Claimant performed his work, and the majority of the factors from Hill did not indicate an employment relationship exist. Dicta in the preliminary order stating a nonparty was the employer was vacated for due process grounds.|
|Derrick Onnen v. The Monarch Cement Co. CS-00-0072-007 > AP-00-0463-727||5/3/2022||Does the Workers Compensation Appeals Board have jurisdiction over an order denying a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to K.S.A. 44-523(f)?||A denial of a Motion to Dismiss was appealed to Workers Compensation Appeals Board. The Board held this not a final order and the Board does not have jurisdiction over the appeal.|
|Richard Herrold v. First Group America, Inc. CS-00-0432-877 > AP-00-0462-926||5/2/2022||Was Claimant entitled to an award of temporary total disability compensation?||The Award issued by the ALJ granting, among other things, temporary total disability compensation was affirmed. The record as a whole indicated Claimant was temporarily disabled because he had not reached maximum medical improvement, and Claimant was medically incapable of performing his normal employment. The record also indicated Respondent did not prove one of the statutory defenses to paying temporary total disability compensation applied.|
|Alexis DeSoto v. Spirit Aerosystems, Inc. CS-00-0457-569 > AP-00-0463-762||5/2/2022||Did Claimant sustain personal injury from a motor vehicle accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with Respondent?||The preliminary order issued by the ALJ denying compensability was affirmed. Claimant’s travel to a convenience store from a temporary out-of-state residence for a temporary job assignment outside working hours did not arise out of or in the course of employment. In the alternative, if Claimant was on her way to pick up her coworkers when the accident occurred, it was part of her daily commute and barred under the going and coming rule.|
|Case Name||Order Date||Issue||Holding|
|Ali Raza v. Autozone, Inc. – CS-00-0433-293 > AP-00-0464-116||4/28/2022||1. Is colon polyp removal reasonably necessary to cure and relieve the effects of the claimant’s work injury? 2. May the Board hear respondent’s argument the claimant failed to prove the work accident was the prevailing factor giving rise to the need for colon polyp removal, given no such argument was made to the ALJ and the ALJ made no decision regarding prevailing factor?||The ALJ’s Order was affirmed upon the finding that the claimant needs kidney replacement surgery due to his work-related accident. The issue of prevailing factor was not addressed as it was not argued before the ALJ and no decision was made on the issue by the ALJ.|
|Gabriela Ornelas v. Penney Opco., LLC. CS-00-0462-614 AP-00-0463-985||4/25/2022||Did Claimant sustain personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment, including whether the accident was the prevailing factor in Claimant's current medical condition and need for treatment?||A Single Board Member found Claimant failed to prove by a greater weight of the evidence her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment and her work-related injury on September 20, 2021, was the prevailing factor causing her injury, medical condition and need for treatment. This reversed ALJ Hursh's Order finding Claimant's claim compensable.|
|Jarin Tabor v. City of Topeka CS-00-0460-981 AP-00-0463-695||4/15/2022||Did Claimant sustain an occupational disease or repetitve injury arising out of and in the course of his employment?||Claimant appealed the preliminary hearing Order denying his request for benefits. The ALJ found Claimant failed in his burden to prove he suffered personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by repetitive trauma or occupational disease. Claimant was an urban watershed horticulturist which exposed him to various native grasses and wild flowers. A single Board Member affirmed the ALJ's Order.|
|Rex Allen v. Action Tents, Inc. CS-00-0459-448 AP-00-0463-348||4/14/2022||Did Claimant give proper notice of his injury by repetitive trauma to Respondent?||A single Board Member affirmed the ALJ’s preliminary Order denying compensation. Based on review of the record as a whole, Claimant failed to prove he gave notice he either sustained a work-related injury from repetitive trauma or was seeking workers compensation benefits until more than ten days from the last day actually worked. Claimant’s prior complaints of pain, with no further specifics, did not constitute proper notice.|
|Martin Sanchez v. City of Dodge City CS-00-0309-870 AP-00-0461-948||4/12/2022||Did Claimant sustain personal injury from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with Respondent?||A majority of the Appeals Board affirmed the ALJ’s Award denying the claim, after concluding Claimant’s injuries were caused by an accident not arising out of and in the course of his employment. Claimant was voluntarily lifting weights at a gym provided by Respondent over Claimant’s paid lunch break to prepare for a fitness test and for general fitness, but Claimant was not instructed to use the gym and Claimant’s employment would not be jeopardized if he failed the test. The remaining issues were moot. One Board Member dissented, because Claimant was preparing for a mandatory fitness test and Respondent benefitted from having physically fit patrol officers.|
|Marilyn Menefee v. Amazon.com.KSDC, LLC CS-00-0005-779 AP-00-0462-005||4/6/2022||1. Was proper notice given? 2. Is Claimant’s accident the prevailing factor for Claimant’s injuries, need for medical treatment and resulting disability and impairment?||Proper notice was given in this case because Respondent had actual notice at the time of Claimant’s accident. Claimant’s accident was not the prevailing factor for Claimant’s injuries, need for medical treatment or resulting disability because it was too remote in time as to when Claimant sought medical treatment. Claimant did not seek medical treatment for her injuries until 7 months after the accident. Immediately after the accident Claimant continued to work without absences, restrictions or seeking medical treatment for 10 weeks. Claimant sought medical treatment 10 weeks after the accident for a heart condition and not her injuries.|
|Tammy Cline v. Spirit Aerosystems CS-00-0128-103 AP-00-0462-623||4/6/2022||1. Did Claimant's cervical spine injury arise out of and in the course of her employment and was the work accident of September 26, 2017, the prevailing factor causing injury to Claimant's cervical spine and subsequent need for surgery? 2. What is the nature and extent of Claimant's disability? 3. Is Claimant entitled to future medical benefits?||Claimant appeals her Award denying benefits for injuries sustained to her cervical spine. Claimant was pinched between two tables & was found to have compensable claims to her low back & hips. Approximately six months following her injury, claimant received treatment, at her own expense, for cervical complaints and numbness/tingling in her upper extremities. The Board affirmed the ALJ's denial of benefits due to her cervical spine injuries. Claimant failed to prove her cervical spine injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment and also the accidental injury was the prevailing factor causing her cervical spine injury and need for treatment.|
|Brenda Willming v. Atchison Hospital and KHA Workers Compensation Fund, Inc. CS-00-0443-834; AP-00-0460-733||4/1/2022||1. Should the attachments to Claimant's brief be considered part of the record? 2. Did the Administrative Law Judge err in failing to rule on the objections raised during an expert's deposition? 3. Was the Social Security offset provision of K.S.A. 44-501(f) applied in an unconstitutional manner? 4. Nature and extent of disability, including extent of functional impairment, eligibility for work disability and permanent total disability. 5. Should an offset for Social Security retirement be applied, and if so, the value of the offset, whether Social Security retirement not actually received should be imputed, and the effective date? 6. Future medical.||The Award issued by the ALJ was modified. The attachments to Claimant’s brief were not considered part of the record. The ALJ ruled on the objections raised during the deposition, and did not commit error. The constitutional issue was reserved for the appellate courts. Claimant was eligible to receive permanent partial disability compensation based on 9% of the body as a whole, followed by 57% work disability compensation, but her claim for permanent total disability compensation was denied. The Social Security offset contained in the Award was modified to reflect sums Claimant actually received, and not sums imputed to Claimant, effective the date actually received. The future medical award was affirmed.|
|Case Name||Order Date||Issue||Holding|
|Lisa Plumb v. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc. CS-00-0458-703 AP-00-0463-248||3/31/2022||Did Claimant prove she suffered an injury arising out and in the course of Claimant’s employment?||Claimant had a preexisting injury to her low back and her work injury was an aggravation or exacerbation of her preexisting injury. Claimant was not awarded benefits.|
|Mickey Saunders v. Three D Trucking CS-00-0444-365 AP-00-0461-658||3/29/2022||Independent Contractor||The ALJ found Claimant to be an independent contractor and denied benefits. Claimant appealed. The Board found Respondent maintained the right to control almost every aspect of Claimant’s work activity. he weight of the evidence supported finding claimant an employee, rather than and independent contractor. Reversed and Remanded.|
|John Foster v. Hiland Dairy Foods Co., LLC CS-00-0458-875 AP-00-0462-824||3/25/2022||Did Claimant sustain personal injury from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with Respondent?||The preliminary Order was affirmed. Claimant proved he sustained personal injury from a fall arising out of and in the course of his employment with Respondent. Respondent did not meet its burden of proving the fall was either the product of a personal risk or from a neutral risk with no particular employment or personal character.|
|Siniki Thomas v. Old Dominion Freight Lines CS-00-0366-123 AP-00-0463-726||3/24/2022||Did the Board have jurisdiction to hear the respondent's appeal of the ALJ's order denying a motion to dismiss under K.S.A. 44-523(f)?||The Board ruled it did not have jurisdiction to consider the respondent’s appeal of the ALJ’s interlocutory order denying the motion to dismiss.|
|Katherine Eaton v. Emporia U.S.D. No. 253 CS-00-0434-415 AP-00-0462-505||3/24/2022||1. Did the claimant prove a compensable traumatic neurosis due to an assault by a student? 2. Did the claimant prove a right ankle injury due to altered gait following her compensable left leg injury? 3. Did the claimant prove entitlement to future medical treatment?||The SALJ concluded the claimant did not prove a compensable traumatic neurosis or right ankle injury or impairment. The claimant appealed. The Board affirmed the SALJ’s decision.|
|Lorrie Lott v. Kansas Star Casino, LLC CS-00-0460-777 AP-00-0462-400||3/23/2022||Did Claimant meet her burden of proving she sustained personal injury by repetitive trauma arising out of and in the course of her employment with Respondent?||The preliminary Order was affirmed. Claimant proved she sustained a progressive injury by repetitive trauma. Claimant need not present radiologic studies to demonstrate the repetitive nature of the injury by “diagnostic or clinical tests.”|
|Judy Keenan v. State of Kansas CS-00-0447-729 AP-00-0462-203||3/22/2022||1. Whether Claimant was entitled to a modification of her Award and, if so, what is the nature and extent of the modification? 2. Was Respondent entitled to a credit pursuant to K.S.A. 44-501(e)?||The Board found Claimant did suffer an increase in her functional impairment, but was not entitled to a modification of her award because her request for review/modification was filed well past the 415 week limitation. The Board further found Respondent was not entitled to a credit.|
|Judy Keenan v. State of Kansas CS-00-0267-277 AP-00-0462-204||3/22/2022||1. Whether Claimant was entitled to a modification of her Award and, if so, what is the nature and extent of the modification? 2. Was Respondent entitled to a credit pursuant to K.S.A. 44-501(e)?||The Board found Claimant did suffer an increase in her functional impairment, but was not entitled to a modification of her award because her request for review/modification was filed well past the 415 week limitation. The Board further found Respondent was not entitled to a credit.|
|Guadalupe Garcia v. Tyson Fresh Meats CS-00-0053-632 AP-00-0451-895||3/15/2022||Nature and Extent of impariment.||The Board issued an Order for Remand to the ALJ with instructions to "afford the parties the opportunity to supplement the record with opinions from the examining physicians concerning Claimant's impairment of function. The ALJ is also instructed to issue an order on remand making findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the nature and extent of Claimant's impairment." The Order on Remand was issued in response to the Kansas Court of Appeals decision.|
|Sundown Jacobs v. State of Kansas CS-00-0444-106 AP-00-0461-809||3/10/2022||What is the extent of impairment for two scheduled injuries?||The Board adopted the only body as whole impairment rating for bilateral shoulder injuries put in evidence. Respondent’s rating was based on two scheduled impairment ratings from two different doctors.|
|Sundown Jacobs v. State of Kansas CS-00-0339-793 AP-00-0461-810||3/10/2022||What is the extent of impairment for two scheduled injuries?||The Board adopted the only body as whole impairment rating for bilateral shoulder injuries put in evidence. Respondent’s rating was based on two scheduled impairment ratings from two different doctors.|
|Sundown Jacobs v. State of Kansas CS-00-0316-236 AP-00-0461-811||3/10/2022||What is the extent of impairment for two scheduled injuries?||The Board adopted the only body as whole impairment rating for bilateral shoulder injuries put in evidence. Respondent’s rating was based on two scheduled impairment ratings from two different doctors.|
|Richard Grounds v. Excel, Inc. CS-00-0459-488 AP-00-0462-953||3/9/2022||Horseplay||The ALJ found Claimant did not voluntarily participate in horseplay and ordered respondent to provide treatment for Claimant’s right knee injury and pay medical bills. The ALJ denied temporary total disability benefits because Claimant voluntarily resigned. Respondent appealed, alleging ALJ failed to consider credibility of witnesses on horseplay issue, and ALJ did not have jurisdiction to order payment of medical bills without bills being placed into evidence. The Board found respondent did not prove affirmative defense of horseplay, and no jurisdiction under K.S.A.44-534a to review the order for payment of medical bills.|
|Order Date||Case Name||Issue||Holding|
|25-Feb-22||Stryker v. Sugar Creek Packing Company, AP-00-0461-236, CS-00-0338-508||Injury arising out of employment||The ALJ found claimant suffered a sole aggravation of a preexisting condition and denied the claim for compensation. The Board found claimant failed to prove a lesion or change in the physical structure of the body as required by K.S.A. 44-508(e). The Board also found claimant failed prove she suffered more than a sole aggravation of a preexisting condition as required by K.S.A. 44-508(f)(2). Affirmed.|
|24-Feb-22||Kennedy v. Prophet Painting, AP-00-0463-222, CS-00-0459-380||Did the claimant prove the respondent had sufficient payroll to be required to provide workers compensation coverage?||The ALJ concluded the claimant did not prove the respondent had the requisite payroll for coverage under the Act. The claimant appealed. A single Board Member affirmed the ALJ’s decision, which encouraged the claimant to obtain additional evidence to prove the payroll.|
|22-Feb-22||Schmidt v. Crustbusters, Inc. AP-00-0462-808; CS-00-0436-091||Secondary injury rule||The Board found Claimant’s left knee injury is the prevailing factor in causing injury to Claimant’s right knee. This is an example of the application of the secondary injury rule.|
|11-Feb-22||Ramone St. Clair, III v. Providence Medical Center, AP-00-0461-398 and CS-00-0097-560|
Issues: Nature/Extent of Disability > Permanent Total Disability, Work Disability or limited to functional impairment.
Future Medical Benefits.
|The Award of the ALJ was affirmed finding Claimant was entitled to permanent total disability benefits, additional TTD and future medical benefits.|
|9-Feb-22||Hipp v. Dee King Trucking - AP-00-0461-294, CS-00-0456-534||Does an agreement to provide work injury benefits between a Texas employer and their employees bar their employees, when injured in Kansas, from filing and receiving Kansas workers compensation benefits?||Respondent is a Texas employer and Texas allows employers to not participate in the state workers compensation system. Respondent offers their employees with a plan to provide benefits as a result of workplace injuries. Claimant signed an agreement accepting this plan. After Claimant was injured as a result of an accident occurring in Kansas he accepted weekly disability benefits and his medical bills were paid under Respondent’s plan. Claimant filed an application for Kansas workers compensation benefits. The Board issued a preliminary hearing order finding Respondent’s plan did not bar Claimant from filing for Kansas workers compensation benefits and Kansas has jurisdiction over determining Claimant entitlement to such benefits under K.S.A. 44-543(b). However Claimant is barred from receiving benefits under collateral estoppel because Claimant has claimed and received benefits under Respondent’s plan and thus is barred from receiving Kansas workers compensation benefits.|
|1-Feb-22||Eduardo Gordillo v. Coslett Roofing and Construction – AP-00-0461-205; CS-00-0443-898||The issues were “Does the Kansas Workers Compensation Act apply under K.S.A. 44-505(a)” and “Was the claimant an employee of the respondent or an independent contractor?”||The issues were “Does the Kansas Workers Compensation Act apply under K.S.A. 44-505(a)” and “Was the claimant an employee of the respondent or an independent contractor?”|
|1-Feb-22||Lee Webb v Walmart – AP-00-0461-424; CS-00-0447-730 and AP-00-0461-425; CS-00-0447-261||The main issue was “Did the claimant meet with personal injury by accident or repetitive trauma arising out of and in the course of his employment?”||The claimant did not meet his burden of proving he sustained personal injury by accident or repetitive trauma arising out of and in the course of his employment. The claimant did not prove the prevailing factor requirement. The claimant did not prove permanent impairment as a result of his employment.|
|Order Date||Case Name||Issue||Holding|
|31-Jan-22||Cynthia Beitzinger v. U.S.D. 250 – AP-00-0461-864; CS-00-0450-577||At issue was whether Claimant proved she sustained a shoulder injury from an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with Respondent.||Based on review of the record as a whole, one Board member found Claimant’s testimony of the alleged accident was not credible, because it was contradicted by other witnesses, the initial treatment records and did not make logical sense. Therefore, Claimant did not prove she sustained a compensable injury.|
|31-Jan-22||Theresa Burns v. United Plains, AP-00-0462-578; CS-00-0268-255||Did Claimant sustain a compensable injury to her left knee?||Respondent appealed the ALJ’s preliminary hearing Order granting Claimant’s request for medical treatment. The Board affirmed the ALJ’s Order finding Claimant sustained her burden of proving her need for medical treatment was the natural and probable consequence from Claimant’s back injury. “Secondary injuries are compensable if caused primarily by the original work accident and are the natural and probable consequence of the original injury.” Buchanan v. JM Staffing, LLC., 52 Kan App. 2d 943, 951 379 P3d 428 (2016).|
|31-Jan-22||Alex Schell v. City of Topeka -- AP-00-0461-191: CS-00-0444-211||The main issue: Did Claimant suffer an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment and Claimant’s alleged accident the prevailing factor for causing the injury, need for medical treatment, and permanent disability?||The Board ruled Claimant did not prove his right upper extremity injury arose out of and in the course of employment. The preponderance of the evidence established Claimant’s right upper extremity injury was caused by an accident at home instead of the work accident.|
|31-Jan-22||Rochelle Strack v. Restoration Family Services, AP-00-0462-454, CS-00-0459-692|
1. Did the ALJ err in applying the provisions of K.S.A. 44-532a against the Fund and in favor of respondent?
2. Did the ALJ exceed his jurisdiction when he concluded, by applying K.S.A. 44-532a to the evidence, respondent is "preliminarily financially unable to pay" the costs and medical bills associated with this case, despite the evidence showing respondent's assets exceed its debts?
3. May the Fund avail itself of K.S.A. 44-534a(a)(2) and whether "certain defenses apply" for purposes of a preliminary hearing order?
|The ALJ found respondent financially unable to pay and assessed liability against the Fund. The Fund appealed alleging the ALJ ignored evidence Respondent was able to pay the claim. The Board found no jurisdiction under K.S.A.44-534a to review an assessment against the Fund. Appeal dismissed.|
|28-Jan-22||Justin Rumbaugh v. DirecTV, Inc. -- AP-00-0462-579; CS-00-0154-263||The issue concerned whether the ALJ had authority to apportion medical bills between the respondent and a third-party settlement when no medical bills were ordered paid at all.||The Board affirmed in part as to the claimant not proving entitlement to having the medical bills paid. The Post-Award Medical Award was vacated as to the applicability of accord and satisfaction and with respect to the ALJ bifurcating which medical bills are subject to the subrogation credit.|
|25-Jan-22||Lori Jackson v. Kansas Star Casino, AP-00-0462-214; CS-00-0459-456|
1. Did Claimant provide proper notice of a work-related injury pursuant to K.S.A. 44-520? 2. Did Claimant’s injury arise out of and in the course of Claimant’s employment?
2. Did Claimant’s injury arise out of and in the course of Claimant’s employment?
|This is preliminary hearing case, where it was found Claimant gave proper notice by telling her supervisor of the accident, security personnel and providing a written statement about the accident at the employer’s request. It was also found Claimant had an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment when Claimant slipped and fell in the employee dining room while on break, resulting in her injuries.|
|20-Jan-22||Carl Johnson v. Textron Aviation -- AP-00-0460-708; CS-00-0342-475||The primary issue was whether the prevailing factor for Claimant’s bilateral carpal tunnel was his type 2 diabetes or his repetitive work duties with Respondent.||It was held Claimant’s long-standing type 2 insulin dependent diabetes was the prevailing factor for Claimant’s bilateral carpal tunnel. The Board modified the ALJ Award to disregard an impairment rating due to the holding in Zimero v. Tyson Fresh Meats.|
|20-Jan-22||Rominee Flores (Ryals) v. Medicalodges, Inc. -- AP-00-0462-201; CS-00-0452-730 & AP-00-0462-202; CS-00-0452-731||Did the claimant sustain injuries by accidents occurring which arose out of and in the course of her employment?||The claimant was injured in accidents arising out of and in the course of her employment on both occasions. The claimant proved the prevailing factor component of K.S.A. 44-508.|
|14-Jan-22||Debra Ortega v. Encore Rehabilitation Services, AP-00-0460-821; CS-00-0435-279||What is the nature and extent of Ms. Ortega’s impairment?||The ALJ adopted the opinions held by the Court’s examiner and awarded 7 percent whole person impairment. Claimant appealed the nature and extent of impairment. The Board affirmed, finding the Court-ordered examiner used the AMA Guides, 6th Edition, as a starting point and added additional impairment for a condition not included in the Guides. The claimant’s examiner simply assessed impairment without stating the Guides failed to account for actual impairment. Affirmed.|
|4-Jan-22||Scott Abel v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., AP-00-0460-784, CS-00-0040-369||The main issue was “did the claimant's injury arise out of and in the course of his employment, including whether the accident was the prevailing factor causing his injury, need for medical treatment and resulting impairment?”||The Board concluded: (1) the claimant’s underlying and preexisting degenerative hip injury or condition was solely rendered symptomatic by the event on March 30, 2018, which is not compensable under K.S.A. 44-508(f)(2); and (2) the prevailing factor in the claimant’s injury, medical condition and impairment or disability is his preexisting hip arthritis. The remaining issues were moot.|
|3-Jan-22||Breanna Brandt v. Walmart, AP-00-0461-951; CS-00-0458-806||1. Was Claimant’s accidental injury to the right shoulder on April 26, 2021, the prevailing factor for Claimant’s medical condition and need for treatment. 2. Did the ALJ err in not ordering an independent medical evaluation?||Claimant appealed a preliminary hearing order denying Claimant’s request for benefits. The Board affirmed the ALJ’s order Claimant failed to prove her accident was the prevailing factor causing her injury, medical condition and need for treatment.|
|3-Jan-22||James Zuren v. RND Underground, AP-00-0461-797; CS-00-0214-547||Appeal from an Order to dismiss pursuant to K.S.A. 44-513(f). Excusable neglect was raised as a defense to the Motion to Dismiss.||The Board ruled, in affirming the ALJ, excusable does not apply to K.S.A. 44-523(f) because adding excusable neglect as a defense is adding a provision to the law statute that is not there. See Bergstrom v. Spears Manufacturing, 289 Kan. 605,608, 214 P.3d 676 (2009) and Jones v. Continental Can, 206 Kan. 547, 920 P.2d939 (1996).|
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KSA 44-551(d) gives the Director the authority to appoint Special Administrative Law Judges for the purpose of examining and hearing any designated cases. Special Administrative Law Judges shall be attorneys admitted to practice law in Kansas. They shall have the same authority to exercise powers of regular Administrative Law Judges. Special Administrative Law Judges shall be paid according K.A.R. 51-2-5. (*K.A.R. 51-2-5 amended, effective November 11, 2005).
Special Administrative Law Judges fees include:
- $50.00 for each settlement hearing heard as part of a regular settlement docket.
- $50.00 for each settlement hearing heard as an individual setting.
- $100.00 for each preliminary hearing including a preliminary award or for a full hearing.
- $100.00 for each pre-hearing settlement conference.
- $85.00 per hour for preparing and rendering a final award. Total not to exceed $500.00. (b) If a special local administrative law judge incurs expenses conducting one or more settlement hearings in a location other than the judge's home community, the expenses shall be assessed as costs proportionately among the cases generating the expenses.
List of Current Special Administrative Law Judges
Determine Special Administrative Law Judges that serve in your county using the list below.